Suchergebnisse

Aggregate data studies of domestic political conflict have used an Action-Reaction (AR) model that has produced contradictory findings about the repression/dissent nexus: Repression by regimes may either increase or decrease dissent by opposition groups. To clarify these findings I propose an alternative Rational Actor (RA) model from which are derived three propositions. (1) An increase in a government's repression of nonviolence will reduce the nonviolent activities of an opposition group but increase its violent activities. (2) The balance of effects, that is, whether an increase in the regime's repression increases or decreases the opposition group's total dissident activities, depends upon the government's accommodative policy to the group. (3) Consistent government accommodative and repressive policies reduce dissent; inconsistent policies increase dissent. The RA model thus accounts for the contradictory findings produced by the AR-based aggregate data studies of repression and dissent.

Research in quantitative international politics and peace science is dominated by two puzzles and their corresponding research designs. (1) Why do some nations fight wars more often than others? (2) Which system characteristics contribute to war? What is often neglected is a third puzzle: Why do particular nations fight each other? Dyadic analyses are most useful for dealing with this problem, and can be used to test the preferred policy of national security elites on matters such as deterrence. An empirical investigation is carried out to discover whether extended nuclear deterrence has reduced the risk of war in the 1960s and 1970s. While the evidence provides only moderate support, it still confirms the view that extended nuclear deterrence has reduced the risk of war.

The quest for cyber theory -- The cyber curse: complications of defense -- Technological revolution and international order -- Third-order cyber revolution: problems of inadvertent conflict -- Second-order cyber revolution: the problem of the revolutionary state -- First-order cyber revolution: pressures from outside the states system -- The deterrence puzzle: doctrinal problems and remedies -- Russia and cyberspace: manifestations of the revolution -- Private-sector active defense: an adequate response to the sovereignty gap? -- Cyber futures.

With the concept of 'Atomic Anxiety', this book offers a novel perspective on one of the most important and longstanding puzzles of international politics: the non-use of U.S. nuclear weapons. By focusing on the fear surrounding nuclear weapons, it explains why nuclear deterrence and the nuclear taboo are working at cross purposes in practice.

In 2007, the Wall Street Journal published an article claiming that each execution saves more than 70 lives. This example is used to show how easy it is, using simple or advanced econometric techniques, to produce results that do or do not support the deterrence hypothesis. Moreover, we also point to some puzzles which have not been satisfactorily solved so far. We then present a critical survey of the papers published in the last ten years. It is shown how simple changes can produce quite different results using the same data. Finally, we draw some conclusions about the usefulness of statistical arguments in policy debates, but also on the moral questions involved in this particular debate.

With the concept of 'Atomic Anxiety', this book offers a novel perspective on one of the most important and longstanding puzzles of international politics: the non-use of U.S. nuclear weapons. By focusing on the fear surrounding nuclear weapons, it explains why nuclear deterrence and the nuclear taboo are working at cross purposes in practice

In 2007, the Wall Street Journal published an article claiming that each execution saves more than 70 lives. This example is used to show how easy it is, using simple or advanced econometric techniques, to produce results that do or do not support the deterrence hypothesis. Moreover, we also point to some puzzles which have not been satisfactorily solved so far. We then present a critical survey of the papers published in the last ten years. It is shown how simple changes can produce quite different results using the same data. Finally, we draw some conclusions about the usefulness of statistical arguments in policy debates, but also on the moral questions involved in this particular debate.

"Foreign Policy Decision Making: Evolution, Models, and Methods" published on by Oxford University Press.

"Strategic Culture(s) in Latin America elucidates why many state-actors in the Global South exhibit a remarkable degree of policy continuity in their external behavior despite structural incentives for change. This book contends that the theoretical notion of strategic culture is instructive to explain such a puzzle. It extends the application of strategic culture beyond the policy of nuclear deterrence among great powers into other equally strategic areas of policy, such as diplomacy, political economy, regional international institutions, legal norms, politico-military institutions, and different security agendas beyond war and peace, for example, the illicit drug-trade and peacekeeping missions. The overall contribution of this book is three-fold: first, it rescues, updates, and expands the original conceptual and theoretical dimensions of strategic culture. Second, it extrapolates further theoretical implications of the concept through its application to five policy domains in Latin America beyond the original application of the strategic culture perspective to nuclear weapons strategy among great powers in the 1970s. Third, it draws together the theoretical and policy implications of the strategic cultures in Latin America and identifies possible applications for other peripheral, non-great power policy areas and issues in the Global South. This book will be of interest to academics, graduate and undergraduate students, policy analysts, and practitioners of Latin American Studies, International Relations Theory and Security Studies"--

Abstract
Nuclear deterrence rests on the survivability of nuclear arsenals. For much of the nuclear age, "counterforce" disarming attacks—those aimed at eliminating an opponent's nuclear forces—were nearly impossible because of the ability of potential victims to hide and protect their weapons. Technological developments, however, are eroding this foundation of nuclear deterrence. Advances rooted in the computer revolution have made nuclear forces around the world considerably more vulnerable. Specifically, two key approaches that countries have relied on to ensure arsenal survivability since the dawn of the nuclear age—hardening and concealment—have been undercut by leaps in weapons accuracy and a revolution in remote sensing. Various methods, evidence, and models demonstrate the emergence of new possibilities for counterforce disarming strikes. In short, the task of securing nuclear arsenals against attack is far more difficult than it was in the past. The new era of counterforce challenges the basis for confidence in contemporary deterrence stability, raises critical issues for national and international security policy, and sheds light on one of the enduring theoretical puzzles of the nuclear era: why international security competition has endured in the shadow of the nuclear revolution.

AbstractIn an effort to break the link between districts' lack of competitiveness and the election of ideologues, Washington and California recently adopted the "top-two" primary election system. Among other features, the top-two primary allows members of the same party to run against one another in the general election. Although proponents argue that this system encourages the election of more moderate candidates in highly partisan districts, early reports have uncovered mixed evidence of this effect. This study addresses this puzzle by first disentangling the conditions under which one should expect such primaries to encourage the election of more moderate candidates. Using election returns data from the 2008 through 2014 elections, I find that districts facing same-party general-election competition do elect more moderate legislators than similar districts not subject to same-party competition. However, using an application of a common regression discontinuity diagnostic test, I also find that elite actors appear able to strategically avoid this kind of competition—partially explaining why broader effects of the top-two have not been uncovered. The findings contribute not only to ongoing debates about the effectiveness of the top-two primary, but also to our understanding of how political elites may maneuver institutional changes to their own benefit.

The Myth of Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age is co-written by Keir Lieber and Daryl Press. The authors assess what they refer to as the "central puzzle" of the nuclear age as it currently stands: "the intensity of competition in an era in which victory seemed impossible" (29). They analyze why geopolitical competition persists despite the deterrence developed by the creation and evolution of nuclear weapons. This book aims to solve the Nuclear Puzzle: "if nuclear weapons are such powerful instruments of deterrence then why do so many aspects of international competition in the nuclear age resemble those of the prenuclear era? Why do nuclear powers continue to fear rising powers, strive for superior weaponry, build entangling allies, and covet strategically advantageous territory? If nuclear-armed countries are fundamentally secure from attack, why don't they act like it?" (120).